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This paper responds to recent calls for further research on the interactions and key 
relationships among governance roles (Ahrens et al., 2011), particularly the role of the 
chairperson (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Withers and Fitza, 2017), through the use of qualitative 
methodologies that enable a more direct engagement with the actors and settings involved in 
the governance phenomena (McNulty et al., 2013:184). The study uses elite interviewing 
techniques with 30 chairpersons and CEOs of UK listed companies to inquiry into the role 
demands, constraints, choices and supports of the chairperson of the board of firms facing 
complex, low-munificence environments and poor performance (Krause, 2017; Withers and 
Fitza, 2017). The findings emerging from thematic analysis reveal the centrality of the 
chairperson buffering role in relation to the CEO, which encapsulates a portfolio of other 




cognition, emotion and behaviour in relation to those pressures. In so doing this paper 
contributes do resource dependence theory, by showing that the chairpersons provide resources 
under which have an insulating or regulating function, and that this supports the CEO and the 
board in adapting to environmental change and pressures. The paper provides empirical 
evidence and a case for an integrated view of the chairperson role(s) in contexts of resource-
scarcity, complexity and poor performance, as well as important avenues for future research on 
the role of the chairperson.  
 
Introduction 
Uncertainty, low munificence, complexity and disruption are now permanent features of 
a globalised business world. The unprecedented pace of technology innovation, global 
competition, shifts in the consumer patterns and shareholder activism, for example, all converge 
to put more and more demands and pressures – often insurmountable – on the shoulders of top 
officers of listed companies. This makes it difficult to craft and sustain a consensus on how the 
firm should be directed and governed. Shareholders, boards, analysts and other stakeholders 
continually send out different and sometimes contradictory expectations that press the CEO to 
make particular choices or go in different directions. It is not uncommon that non-executive 
directors (NEDs) in such circumstances become defensive and constrain the CEO from raising 
and addressing important issues due to fear of loss of reputation as expert monitors (Fama, 
1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Indeed, in poorly-performing firms NEDs ‘might be tempted to 
abandon the firm to limit the damage to their reputation, evade legal liability and escape the 
workload of restructuring an underperforming firm’ (Yermack, 2004: 294). CEOs also often 
face contradictory expectations from resource providers to go in different directions (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). Exchange markets often place more emphasis on short-term gains against 
long-term investments (Hansen and Hill, 1991; Short and Keasey, 1997) with different classes 




expectations create a difficult task for the CEO to be able to reconcile them into one agenda 
(Czarniawska, 1985). In business contexts characterized by resource scarcity and uncertainty, 
CEOs may be over-influenced by resource providers and other market players’ positions, as 
companies are often in need of raising new capital (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996). Recent studies 
find that analysts’ negative recommendations result in a higher probability of CEO dismissal 
(Wiersema and Zhang, 2011), are consequential to investors’ decisions (Barber et al., 2001) 
and impact on CEOs’ behaviour and corporate governance (Westphal and Graebner, 2010; Yu, 
2008). Moreover, studies have found that during technology change periods, increasingly, 
negative analysts’ recommendations are associated with firms reducing the level of strategic 
investments, thus suggesting analysts affect the strategic direction of firms (Benner and 
Ranganathan, 2012). Those firms who persevere with long-term technology investments are 
likely to face continued increased pressure to align with analysts and shareholders (Suchman, 
1995). Firms that persist in long-term investments, despite analysts and market negative 
recommendations, often engage in higher share buyback to signal alignment with shareholders 
(Benner and Ranganatham’s, 2012). Other stakeholders such as the government, unions, 
employees, suppliers and environmental and socially concerned organisations add to the 
complex net of demands, constraints and choices faced by CEOs in such circumstances. It is 
because of these complexities that CEOs have been depicted as buffers (Mintzberg, 2009), 
boundary-spanners (Pffefer and Slancick, 1978) and expectations handlers (Tengblad, 2004). 
As the CEO role is exposed to multiple and often contradictory expectations from the board, 
analysts, shareholders and investors, and other stakeholders he/she often struggles to manage 
the firm in a way that takes due and balanced account of this variety of pressures. Risks exist 
in managing for the short term, diminishing commitment to long-term value creation (e.g. 




overconfidence (e.g. Chen et al., 2015), escalating commitment (Brockner, 1992; Staw, 1981) 
and a whole range of different behaviours. 
Yet, with the increased preference of regulators for a separate leadership structure, we 
know very little of what is the role of the chairperson in this process of ensuring alignment 
among these different expectations in contexts of uncertainty, low-munificence and poor 
performance. Past research has depicted the chairperson role in the UK as the leader of the 
board and the enabler of strategic change (Parker, 1990). More recent research showed that the 
board chair explains nine per cent of variation in firm performance over and above that 
explained by the CEO, especially when the environment is characterized by complexity and 
low-munificence (Withers and Fitza, 2017). Further, Krause (2017) showed the importance of 
separate chairs who have a collaborative approach to the relationship with CEO providing 
frequent advise and guidance, relieving the CEO from board leadership demands through 
specialization, while representing the firm externally with a variety of stakeholders. These later 
studies have called for more fine-grained research that examines the role played by the 
chairperson in environments characterized by complexity, low-munificence and poor 
performance (Withers and Fitza, 2017). This paper responds to such calls.  
The paper starts by reviewing the literature on leadership structures and the role of the 
chairperson. It then discusses extant research on the chairperson as the leader of the board and 
his/her relationship with the CEO. The research design is then presented including the approach, 
sample and data collection and analysis. It follows a section of discussion and findings and the 
paper closes with conclusions, limitations and future research avenues.   
 
Literature Review 
Leadership structure and the chairperson role 
Board of director’s leadership structure has been subject to a vigorous, yet for the most 




company performance (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Rechner and Dalton, 
1991). Stewardship theorists support the view that a combined role of CEO and chairperson 
provides the required unambiguous leadership, unity of command and collaboration 
(Donaldson, 1990; Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1071) and found some positive 
associations between this type of leadership structure and company performance (Donaldson 
and Davies, 1991; Slatter and Lovett, 1999). Agency theorists, on the other hand, argue for a 
separate and independent leadership structure given the necessity to monitor CEO behaviour 
and ensure alignment of interests between the CEO and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). The chairperson would thus fulfil a monitoring function. Studies 
in this tradition have argued that a combined role paves the way for CEO unfettered power and 
lack of monitoring often leading to corporate failure (Daily and Dalton, 1993) or weakened 
company performance (Coles, McWilliams, and Sen, 2001; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). 
Contingency studies found contradictory results. Boyd (1995) found that a combined role leads 
to a better return on investment (ROI) in companies that are resource constrained or have higher 
complexity, whereas Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) found the combined leadership structure 
to be associated with worse performance in firms experiencing turbulent environments. A third 
theoretical perspective, that of resource-dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) also 
supports separate roles, as this increases the availability and provision of resources to the CEO 
and the board (Withers and Fitza, 2017). Under this perspective the role of chairperson is to act 
as boundary spanner and resource provider, including the provision of legitimacy, networks, 
external perspective, complementary skills, experience and advise (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000).  
Despite the debate and inconclusive findings regulators around the world are moving to 
encourage or mandate the adoption of a separate leadership structure. The UK leads this process 




2014), whereas the US follows modestly but steadily behind with 46% of Standard & Poor’s 
500 having a separate leadership structure (Spencer Stuart, 2014).   
 
The chairperson as leader of the board 
Regardless of whether the chairperson is also the CEO, a core and widely accepted 
domain of their role is to act as the leader of the board. In effect, UK regulations, such as the 
Financial Reporting Council guidance on board effectiveness (FRC, 2011) and the UK 
corporate governance code (FRC, 2016) place a great deal of emphasis on the chairperson as 
the leader of the board. In the 2011 guidance on board effectiveness the Financial Reporting 
Council states that “Good boards are created by good chairmen. The chairman creates the 
conditions for overall board and individual director effectiveness” (FRC, 2011: 2). From then 
on the focus is on the individual qualities and discrete tasks that chairpersons are expected to 
perform as leaders of the board, including: setting expectations relating to company culture, 
values and behaviours, and the style and tone of board discussions; demonstrate ethical 
leadership; setting the board agenda ; ensure a timely flow of high-quality supporting 
information; succession planning and board composition; structure and composition of board 
committees; promote board evaluation; and skilfully conduct board meetings where there is 
sufficient challenge to major proposals and high quality of debate. The relationship with the 
CEO and the communication with shareholders and other stakeholders as important tasks of the 
chairperson are comparatively to board leadership only briefly mentioned. Academic research 
as also focused much more on the chairperson role as the leader of the board. Numerous studies 
on board composition from a resource-dependence perspective have suggested that 
chairpersons compose the board so that they can reduce uncertainty and reflect the variety of 
challenges presented by the external environment (Hillman, Cannella, and Paetzold, 2000; 
Parker, 1990; Pfeffer, 1972), whereas others suggested that chairs could use board composition 




importance of chairpersons in promoting non-executive director’s engagement with the 
business as a way to more effectively engage in monitoring and advising management (Carter 
and Lorsch, 2004; McCabe and Nowak, 2008; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995). It is thus for the 
chairperson to set the tone and expectations of NED engagement and contribution (Roberts, 
McNulty and Stiles, 2005). Chairpersons are also the important connection that establishes the 
tone for engagement between the board and the CEO (Bailey and Peck, 2013; Leblanc and 
Gillies, 2005), set the board agenda to avoid domination of this process by the CEO (Bailey and 
Peck, 2013; McNulty et al., 2011; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), and oversee how board 
committees are structured and work (Spira and Bender, 2004). Finally, but importantly, 
chairpersons as leaders of the board are expected to conduct effective board meetings by means 
of open discussion and debate, which is a major determinant of board effectiveness (Bailey and 
Peck, 2013; Garratt, 1999; McNulty et al., 2011). It is for the chairperson to act as a conductor, 
manage dissent and work towards a consensual common view, setting the tone for governance 
matters (Leblanc, 2004). To accomplish this role incumbents are required to be acutely aware 
of board climate, sensing changes in mood, and understand changing dynamics (Kakabadse et 
al., 2011). Research and praxis have focused much less on the role(s) the chairperson plays in 
his relationship with the CEO.  
 
 
The chairperson roles in relation to the CEO 
Considerations about the duality of the CEO role have failed to provide conclusive 
evidence of effective boardroom leadership (Boyd, 1995; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; 
Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Taken together with the general preference of UK regulators for 
separating the roles of chairperson and CEO, this has led researchers to focus on the quality of 
the relationship between the two roles (Pye, 2005; Roberts and Stiles, 1999; Kakabadse, 




In regimes with role separation, the centrality of the chairperson–CEO relationship for 
boardroom effectiveness and the long-term sustainability of the corporation is a conclusion that 
has perhaps achieved most consensus. This relationship is often described as pivotal and sacred 
(Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2008; Leblanc and 
Gillies, 2005; Levrau and Van den Berghe, 2013), or the “fulcrum around which directing is 
levered”, and it is described as being highly contextual in nature (Pye, 2005). 
The study of how role arrangements are formed and how they impact each other was first 
developed by Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik (1965) in a pioneering study of three executives’ 
“role constellations”. Hodgson and his colleagues referred to a process of “emotional division 
of labor” and specialisation of function by each role-holder, so that they become complementary 
and form a balanced “integrated whole” (Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik, 1965:xxi). 
Referring to pairs as a stable and effective “role constellation”, Hodgson explained how some 
pairs were found to specialise in internal demands and external, boundary-spanning activities 
(Hodgson, Levinson and Zaleznik, 1965). Chitayat’s study (1984), which investigated the 
working relationships between Israeli CEOs and chairmen, found that, while there was a great 
variation in the relative functions depending on a firm’s structure and the incumbent’s 
personality, the role of the chair as consulting and coaching the CEO emerged as the most 
important. Stewart’s longitudinal study (1991) of 20 relationships between chairmen and their 
general managers found that the chairperson and CEO roles (when separated) are impacted by 
organisational structure, personality, and the time that the chairperson devotes to the role. The 
study identifies and describes five chairperson roles in relation to the CEO: partner; executive; 
mentor; consultant; and distant (Stewart, 1991). Stewart concluded that the roles of 
chairpersons and general managers are highly interdependent, and that this mutual dependence 
is highly contextual in nature (Stewart, 1991). Since these early studies, evidence has emerged 




relationship between the chairperson and CEO has moved from a “distanced approach” to one 
that is more “interdependent and dynamic”, characterised by a sense of “partnership, mutual 
respect, understanding and trust”, where issues are brought to the board only when the 
chairperson and CEO have previously agreed to do so. Further, the role of the chairperson was 
often viewed by non-executive directors (NEDs) interviewed as “potentially major value adders 
or destroyers” in relation to both NEDs’ and CEOs’ effectiveness (Pye, 2000:345). Other 
studies indicate that a complementary relationship between the chairperson and CEO provides 
“a context in which the CEO can think provisionally in a way that acknowledges the ambiguity 
and uncertainty that is the ground of decision-making” (Roberts, 2002:504). “Building the 
basis for trust” between the two roles by enabling open communication of concerns avoids 
misunderstandings about each other’s intentions and requires a “high level of routine contact 
between the two” (Roberts, 2002:502). Pye (2005) has shown that, in the UK context, the time 
the chairperson devotes to company affairs is irrelevant as a proxy for involvement; the key 
was the quality of relationship with the CEO, which, if poor, can create “a lot of bad behavior 
on both sides (board and management)” which has implications for relationships with external 
stakeholders such as investors (Pye, 2005:77). It is argued that this relationship is the building 
block of boardroom culture, determining how board members behave and contribute, as well 
as the quality of board–management relationships (Pye, 2005; Roberts, 2002; Roberts and 
Stiles, 1999). A further study by Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt (2006) referred to role 
delineation as the critical element, and as such conferred a distinct advantage on UK leadership 
structure compared to that of the US. Hence, “tensions between the two could be attributed 
both to the idiosyncrasies of their personal interaction and also to poorly delineated, peripheral 
responsibilities” (Kakabadse, Kakabadse and Barratt, 2006:142). The relationship between 




and an “ability to interpret information and events in a mutually synergistic manner” 




Qualitative research published on corporate governance topics is sparse among the top 
journals (McNulty et al., 2013). It is increasingly evident that even the meagre qualitative 
research that reaches publication is pressured to conform with traditional quantitative research 
conceptions of validity and reliability leading to the domination of certain forms of theorising, 
or explanatory programmes (for a good discussion see Cornelissen, 2017).   
Despite these discouraging figures for qualitative researchers, important governance 
scholars are setting new aspirations “to greater use of qualitative methods that explore processes 
and interactions in a real empirical context, and follow a more eclectic range of theoretical 
frameworks” (McNulty et al., 2013: 184). This study has attempted to contribute to such 
aspirations, yet without compromising the basic tenets of qualitative research in favour of other, 
equally fallible conceptions of validity, reliability and theorising (Cornelissen, 2017; Shaw, 
2017).  
The research design is therefore qualitative, exploratory and inductive, aiming at 
digging deeper into the chairperson role in environments characterised by uncertainty, low-
munificence and poor firm performance (Withers and Fitza, 2017).  
 
Sample 
This study uses a non-probability, purposive sampling where selection criteria are derived 
primarily from the research question (Patton, 2002). As a general guide, Creswell (2007) 
recommends 25–30 interviews be undertaken for a general qualitative study. In a recent review 




between 15 and 60 interviews acceptable, subject to the nature of the research question and 
conventions in the area of study. Prior studies examining the roles of CEO and/or chairpersons 
and board behavior have used similar sample sizes (e.g. Stewart, 1991; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Kakabadse et al., 2001; Bailey and Peck, 
2013).  
In line with general recommendation for qualitative research and past studies in the field, 
the initial sample size envisaged was 20 individuals with significant experience as CEO and/or 
chairperson. Data saturation (i.e. the point in data collection where no new data emerges that 
modifies existing conceptual categories or creates new ones) (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was 
reached at interview fifteen. However, to strengthen the validity of the themes’ content and to 
take advantage of the unique access obtained to interview board directors, researchers continued 
to gather additional interviews, which served to confirm the themes that were emerging (Francis 
et al., 2010). Participants were selected on the basis of their substantial experience as 
chairperson and/or CEO roles in multiple boards of UK listed companies. The final sample size 
was 30 board directors. 
The individuals composing the final sample were truly high-profile elites among the UK 
business upper echelons. Many held prestigious titles such as Lord, whilst many others had 
been appointed to the Order of the British Empire (OBE). Some had held important roles in the 
British government. Virtually all of the participants had been CEOs and/or chairpersons of 
multi-billion pound businesses in different sectors. Such a list of elite individuals made the 
research both highly interesting and challenging. From the 30 individuals that agreed to 
participate only one was a female. In October 2015, the FTSE 100 boards had reached 26.1 per 
cent female representation (Davies, 2015) and this study strived to ensure that the sample was 
representative of this. The lack of representation of women directors in the sample may be due 




participants from their professional network to take part in the study. Also, the focus of the 
study on chairperson and CEO roles considerably reduced the number of possibilities. At the 
end of 2015, there were only three chairwomen and five female CEOs at FTSE 100 companies 
(only about 4 per cent). The only female director in this study sample represents 3.1 per cent of 
the total sample.  
Furthermore, all participants were from a white background, with 27 White British (WB) 
and three from Other White Background (OWB). Table I, below, provides a characterisation of 




INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
 
The age profile of the sample was also quite homogeneous. The average age of 
participants was 58.7, with chairpersons being older on average (61.8 years) when compared 
with CEOs (55.6 years). Equally interesting to note is the homogeneity of the sample in regards 
to qualifications. Out of the 30 participants, 20 (or 66.6 per cent) were either Chartered 
Accountants (10 individuals) or holders of a Master of Business Administration (MBA) or 
similar qualification (10 individuals). Eight participants had qualifications in a range of subjects 
from economics, geology, international relations and law. For two of the participants it wasn’t 
possible to source their qualification.  
 
Data collection 
This study positions itself within the behavioural and contextual perspectives of 
boardroom study (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004), aiming to examine the chairperson role 




and Zajac, 2008). Consequently, quantitative methodologies have been discounted on the 
grounds that they are not suitable for answering the research question, in that they fail to 
adequately capture behavioural variability in context; nor do they serve the exploratory nature 
of the study.  
Given the obstacles in accessing the “black box” and live boards in particular (Leblanc 
and Schwartz, 2007), interview techniques have been selected by researchers as the primary 
tool with which to examine the behaviour of a firms’ governance roles (e.g. Leblanc and Gillies, 
2005; McNulty et al., 2013). 
Given the high status of the participants a technique of interviewing typical of political 
science was employed: elite interviewing.  It has often been said that elites – business, political 
or otherwise – do not enjoy being, and often refuse to be, straightjacketed by a predetermined, 
sequential ordering of questions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; Kincaid and Bright, 1957). 
The use of open-ended questions is therefore characteristic of elite interviewing, specifically 
when: i) there is a requirement to probe for information; ii) there is little previous research on 
the topic, and; iii) when it is important to give interviewees maximum flexibility in elaborating 
their responses and engage in wide-ranging discussions (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002; 
Kakabadse and Louchart, 2012). In approaching the conduct of interviews in this way, there is 
a recognized trade-off between ‘the advantages of conversational flow and depth of response 
and the disadvantages of inconsistent ordering of questions’ (Aberbach and Rockman, 2002: 
674). Such costs often come in the form of increased difficulty in producing ‘an analytical 
elegant end product’, by making coding and analysis more difficult (Aberbach and Rockman, 
2002: 674). Further, a number of ‘traps’ may emerge when conducting elite interviews: i) one 
or more particular participants more persuasive than the rest can shape the dominant 
understandings of the interviewer; ii) personal bias towards a corporate view; and iii) 




was felt that participants were partially acting as ‘corporate spokesmen’ (Kincaid and Bright, 
1957). Others might have slightly exaggerated or downplayed their roles in the contexts and 
situations that emerged. No doubt some were more persuasive and articulate, or had more 
extroverted personalities, making their points very convincing. The authors dealt with such 
situations through additional questioning (e.g. asking who else was involved and contributed) 
or by asking questions that the researchers knew were likely to be related (e.g. issues that 
emerged from previous interviews describing similar aspects or information in the public 
domain).  
The interviews were conducted between April 2014 and October 2015 and took place at 
the participant’s offices in the city of London, lasting on average 60 minutes. The interviews 
were tape-recorded following permission from the individuals and were subsequently 
transcribed by a professional agency (e.g. Bailey and Peck, 2013). We did not wanted to direct 
the conversation by asking concrete questions about the chairman role, but rather to set a context 
from which such role could emerge in the process of interviewing. Consequently, we have asked 
participants to discuss their experiences as Chairperson / CEO during times of environmental 
distress such as large recessions, financial crisis, and technology disruption where firms were 
performing poorly. Given the difficulty to have chairperson-CEO pairs, we aimed at having a 
balance between chairperson and CEO experiences to compare and contrast the perception, 
experiences and expectations of chairs and CEOs in relation to the chairperson role in 
environments characterised by resource scarcity, complexity and uncertainty.  
 
Data Analysis 
The study uses thematic analysis to inductively identify the roles played by the 
chairperson in firms facing environments characterised by low munificence, complexity and 
failing performance. Thematic analysis is a process utilised by qualitative researchers to encode 




involves an inductive approach to data analysis, using both theoretical and open coding (Glaser 
and Strauss, 1967). Corporate governance literature includes the notion of role as a general term 
rather than as an academic concept. This is surprising, as there is a wealth of role theory models 
and concepts which provide a rich lenses into the actual behaviour of board members holding 
particular roles as well as their interactions (e.g. Stewart, 1982; 1991; Fondas and Stewart, 
1990, 1994).  It is also surprising as the Financial Reporting Council (FRC, 2011) makes 
extensive use of the term of role to specify the responsibilities and behaviors expected from 
governance roles such as chairperson, senior independent director (SID) and Non-Executive 
Director (NED). Role behaviour is the product of the role occupants’ interpretation of the role 
as well as the interpretation of what significant others expect from the role (Fondas and Stewart, 
1990, 1994; Stewart, 1991). Since the object of analysis is the role of the chairperson in a 
specific environment, we have engaged the Demands-constraints-choices (DCC) (Stewart, 
1982). According to this theory of role, roles have demands and constraints (and supports) 
which determine a certain degree of choice on how the role incumbent shapes the role. The 
chairperson role is thus constructed by the role incumbent received interpretation of its own and 
significant others expectations of behaviour (Stewart, 1982).   
Interview data was separated by role (CEO and chairperson) and initial theory-driven 
coding (Glaser, 1992; Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was employed using the Demands-Constraints-
Choices (DCC) model of role (Stewart, 1982). Data was thus coded for the demands, 
constraints, and choices, as well as for supports for each of the roles by two independent 
researchers. Areas of disagreement were resolved through discussion among researchers.  
A second step checked for similarities and differences between demands, constraints, 
choices and supports across the roles of chairperson and CEO. We have contrasted perceptions 
of chairperson role behavior from the perspective of chairpersons themselves and from 




to identify an emerging core theme (and associated sub-themes) that better explained variation 
in the data. An iterative process of going back and forth between the emerging themes and the 
literature allowed for a refinement of those themes and established relationships between them 
(e.g. Boyatsis, 1998; Glaser, 1992).  
Similar data analysis procedures have been employed in boardroom studies looking at 
decision-making styles (Bailey and Peck, 2013), as well as in studies of the relationship between 
chairpersons and CEOs (Stewart, 1991).  
 
The following data structure has emerged as a result: 
 
------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
------------------------------------------- 
Findings and Discussion 
Thematic analysis allowed the identification of 6 main roles played by the chairperson: 
expectations handler, informational, partner/executive, advisory, counselling and leader of the 
board. A further seventh role – that of buffering - emerged from the findings as a central 
organising category which allowed to classify the other six roles as primarily serving an 
insulating or regulating function. As such chairpersons insulate the CEO through: i) their 
expectations handler and; ii) partner/executive roles; their regulating function includes i) 
regulating the information flow between the board/shareholders and the CEO; ii) regulating 
CEO cognition, emotion and behaviour through their advising and counselling roles, and; iii) 
regulating board exchanges through their role as leader of the board. 
 




Buffering is an adaptive mechanism that allows firms to adapt to environmental jolts 
(Lynn, 2005) and the chairperson role might be more influential during poor performance 
(Krause, 2017) and in complex and low munificence environments (Withers and Fitza, 2017). 
In line with the this theoretical arguments, the findings from thematic analysis revealed that 
chairpersons play in fact a fundamental role of buffering in relation to the CEO and to the board 
in contexts of high uncertainty, low-munificence and poor firm performance. Such role of 
buffering is consistently perceived by chairpersons as one of their key roles. This role is 
reinforced by CEOs who generally expect chairpersons to exert this buffering role. 
Environments characterised by uncertainty, low-munificence and poor performance generate 
anxiety on CEOs and it is not uncommon for them to seek this buffering support from the 
chairperson. Mannor et al. (2016) have recently showed that executives facing job anxiety tend 
to rely more on social buffering and engage in less risky strategies when facing perceived loss 
(threat) contexts, but that their buffering behaviors are different when the environment has little 
perceived threats.  
The extract below from a highly experienced chairperson depicts this buffering role as 
his/her main characteristic: 
 
‘So the main characteristic of a chairperson, I think, is you’re there, you’re like a sponge 
in many ways, to be able to take the brickbats and, at the end of the day, you take the crap 
and the executive team take the glory. That’s the way I think it needs to be.’ (Chairperson 
10) 
 
The chairperson is depicted ‘like a sponge’ alluding to the fact that the role occupant 
absorbs tensions, demands and expectations (from the board and shareholders for example) and 
digests them on behalf of the system and particularly of the CEO. In turn CEOs expect 






‘… an ideal chairperson is one who dissipates waves, not extenuates them in either 
direction, the sort of people get in, it’s too one way or the other, and he doesn’t, a bad 
chairperson extenuates, so if the shareholders are complaining a bit, he, a good 
chairperson understands, absorbs and gives the CEO time etc, what he doesn’t do is he 
doesn’t make everything work. [chairperson name] was a superb chairperson in that sense 
that he naturally understood that.’ (CEO 3) 
 
The above extract depicts again the chairperson as someone who ‘absorbs’ expectations 
and tensions arising from dissatisfied shareholders and relieving the CEO from particular 
demands. Literature on organisational buffering defines buffering as “‘the regulation and/or 
insulation of organisational processes, functions, entities or individuals from the effects of 
organisational uncertainty or scarcity’ (Lynn, 2005:38). Literature has often pointed to this role 
of buffering, yet either ignored it or conceptualise it differently. For example, Stewart (1991) 
study on chairperson-CEO relations has quoted chairpersons depicting their role as “taking the 
flack”, “advising the CEO on how he could more effectively handle difficult situations” or 
“support the CEO in those difficult situations…such as a public meeting to protest at the closure 
of a hospital” (Stewart, 1991: 519-521). These insulation and regulation roles have emerged 
strongly from our interview data with chairpersons and CEOs.  
The findings point to the central role of the chairperson as a buffer in contexts of 
uncertainty and low-munificence, where a plethora of other roles are used with purposes of 
insulation or regulation of the CEO and of board exchanges.  
Insulating Roles 
Buffering is normally associated with some kind of insulation or protection from external 
influence. Buffering literature does not define insulation and regulation processes. However, 
insulation generally refers to an idea of protection or relieving someone from perturbation. In 
this study we find that chairpersons perform two insulating roles in relation to the CEO: 





Expectations handler role. Chairpersons play a fundamental role as expectations handler. Such 
role has been depicted by Tengblad (2004) as characterising the CEO, but this study shows that 
in contexts of high uncertainty, low munificence and poor performance this role is central to 
the chairperson activity. In such environments, the CEO is often the target of a number of 
different expectations and pressures from shareholders, the board and market analysts for 
example. It is the chairperson who emerges as the critical role to balance expectations, 
protecting the CEO from certain pressures. These pressures are around strategic direction and 
especially the time it will take to restore the company to growth and profitability. One 
chairperson explained: 
 
‘…my thing as chairperson was to, then to explain to all the stakeholders, the true extent 
and the severity of the problem and what they could expect as a result. So the first thing 
is, in public companies especially you have to define success and you define the timetable, 
don’t let the market do it. People will always encourage you to say this is a problem but 
we can solve it and we’ll turn it around in a year or two, because a lot of people like to 
believe that’. (Chairperson 1) 
 
In the above example a highly experienced chairperson explains how it is important to 
manage expectations relating to the time required to turnaround the company, and how there is 
a danger for CEOs to acquiesce to market expectations and therefore set unrealistic timescales 
and targets to appease the market or the board. Contrast this with the following discussion on a 
case where this was poorly handled:  
‘but he didn’t, in terms of you calling it a vision, I don’t think he explained to the market 
the time you take to turn things around.  I think he needed a lot more time, and a 
supportive chair and a supportive board would have given him the three year, four year 
target, because that’s a super target.  And you don’t change it round quickly, and that’s 
why the new guys get the advantage of, I don’t know whether he's kitchen sinking it or 
not, but he’s certainly got the advantage to rebase expectations on the levels of 
profitability’. (Chairperson 5) 
 
Time and again the role of the chairperson as handling expectations around the work of 
the CEO emerged as a critical insulating mechanism to allow the CEO to maintain a realistic 




done in a honest way – it is not the same as impression management. Consider the following 
chairperson view:  
 
‘And therefore that whole issue of managing expectations is really important, but in an 
honest way so they don’t think you’re sandbagging or trying to protect your figures or 
anything like that’. (Chairperson 5) 
The pressures on the CEO are sometimes so high that he feels compelled to start making 
promises to the market in terms of earnings per share and other key investor metrics which are 
not consistent with the more long-term view. As the CEO is going out of course, chairpersons 
often have to intervene. In such circumstances, chairpersons have to intervene and send strong 
messages to the market (either informally or formally):  
‘I said, I’ve got a management team, I don’t want them bushwhacked because the market 
has no patience….’ (Chairperson 4) 
 
This role played by the chairperson has already been recognised in the literature, albeit 
perhaps not so systematically. Lorsch and Selleke (2005) argue that “the legitimacy and prestige 
of a board chair have been described as highly valuable in placating unhappy shareholders” (p. 
72), while others emphasised the chairperson as representing the firm to a variety of 
stakeholders and secure the required resources that allow the CEO to initiate strategic change 
(Certo, Daily and Dalton, 2001).  
 
Partner role. The partner role played by chairpersons in relation to CEOs is widely established 
(Stewart, 1991). The critical component of this role, we argue, is that it insulates the CEO from 
certain demands by absorbing them, allowing the CEO to focus his/her attention in other 
matters. This partner role implies a certain specialisation of function (Hodgson et al., 1964), 
which relieves the CEO from particular demands and allows him/her to focus efforts where 
he/she can best contribute. It allows for example a balancing between short and long-term 
actions, often with the chairperson taking the long-term view (Roberts, 2002). The following 




‘The chairman and chief executive work as a team. In a good team you don’t all do the 
same thing: there’s a centre-forward and a centre-back, and in a difficult situation the 
chairman has to move into a – you could call it an executive role, but it’s more of a 
leadership role and the chief executive – because there’s so much to do – is taking a line 
of responsibility for the operation’. (CEO 15) 
 
This partner role, insulates the CEO and the management team from certain demands and 
responsibilities that can be distracting. Recent work has come to recognise the importance of 
the partner role. Hambrick et al. (2005) work on executive job demands, argues that relieving 
the CEO from some job demands enables better CEO decision-making. For example Krause (in 
press: 8) indicates that chairpersons may view “advising and guiding the CEO and/or reducing 
the CEO’s job demands to be fundamental attributes of his or her working relationship with the 
CEO”. Further, Krause (2017) has shown the prevalence of a collaborative approach on the 
relationship between chairperson and CEOs, where one fundamental aspect was relieving the 
CEO from board leadership through specialization, enabling greater focus in leading the 
business, or by representing the firm externally with a variety of stakeholders. The chairperson 
of a large entertainment business explained how he “brought a calmness”, ensuring that the 
CEO and the top team were not distracted and were focused on turning the company around:  
 
‘The Senior Management Team weren’t distracted, they were actually getting on with it 
and people were able to get on with the day job instead of being pulled into meetings 
every single week. So I brought a calmness to that. That was a different role’. (Chairman 
8) 
When such partnership fails, because the chairperson is too distant and not willing to take 
on certain demands, the consequences can be dire. One CEO explained he was not properly 
insulated by the chairperson from the multiple stakeholder demands which wanted him to do 
different things operationally. This meant that the CEO was overburdened and was not able to 
cope with both the stakeholder demands and the operational trade-offs making the turnaround 





‘I’m sure the chairman should have helped me, spotted what was going on. We should 
have had a much better division of responsibilities between the stakeholder management 
and the executive, the operational side …’. (CEO 2)  
 
Regulating roles 
Literature on buffering is not explicit as to what regulation side entails. However, 
regulation is often connoted to ensuring something operates in a proper and balanced way, 
adjusted to what’s required. The regulating side of the chairperson buffering role, emerged as 
set of roles that regulate information flows, CEO cognition, emotion and behavior and board 
exchanges during meetings. This roles are next described in regards to their regulating functions 
and include: informational role, advisory role, counselling role and leader of the board role.  
 
Informational role. Chairpersons perform an informational and boundary spanning roles 
(Mintzberg, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Chairpersons and CEOs alike in this study have 
emphasised this role for the chairperson.  
 
‘And if he has a discussion then [chairperson name] he is somehow containing it again 
and channelling it again and giving the feedback to us’ (CEO 10).  
 
Such channelling of information entails a regulation of what information gets passed to 
the CEO and the management team, and importantly, how it gets passed. This chairperson role 
as the regulator of information flows between key governance, shareholders and executive roles 
has been emphasized in the past but remains relatively poorly understood (Roberts and Stiles, 
1999; Carter and Lorsch, 2004).  
 
Advisory role. The advisory role of the chairperson emerged as a further regulating mechanism. 
Chairpersons provide advice to CEOs on important matters such as strategy, risk and 
governance as well as on ‘political issues’. Often in situations of high uncertainty, low-




chairpersons also see this role of advice and guidance as integral part of their role (e.g. Krause, 
2017; Roberts, 2002; Stewart, 199; Withers and Fitza, 2017). This advisory role emerged 
strongly as a mechanism for the CEO to calibrate strategies, plans and the pace and scale of 
change.  
‘On strategic moves definitely, I take him early on board so that he sees the rationale and 
that he starts to challenge where he thinks that we could think further or better on aspects 
I have not yet taken into consideration – and there he has his experience and this is great 
to take profit from’. (CEO 8) 
 
However, how much advice the chairperson provides depends on the situation, the 
urgency of response and critically depends on the levels of trust and perceptions of boundaries 
between the two roles. One CEO explained: 
‘I’d have a lot of conversations with [chairperson name], so in a way you’re just trying to 
calibrate – so this is what I think we should do: let’s calibrate that. Initially, you had no 
time so you were basically saying, “We calibrated it crudely; we’re just going to do it”, 
but as time went on you were able to calibrate that more, think more, get more data and 
think about how you refined it’. (CEO 1) 
 
Counselling role. In environments characterised by high uncertainty, low munificence and poor 
performance the pressures on the CEO increase and this often impacts on CEOs behavior. 
Chairpersons act as counsels (Stewart, 1991) to the CEO and through dialogue seek to maintain 
the CEO emotional stability or avoid the CEO taking decisions or actions based on emotions 
rather than evidence. There are situations which affect the CEO directly in her personal beliefs 
and values and can precipitate a departure, escalating conflicts and/or poor decision-making. 
One chairperson explained:  
 
‘Provided you believe your chief executive is part of the answer rather than part of the 
problem – which is what we had believed and I made sure that the board had that view 
and I’ve conveyed it very strongly to the CEO on a number of occasions – because some 
of this stuff is very hard to take, particularly if it cuts against everything you stand for and 
is in your DNA’. (Chairperson 3)  
 
This counselling role helps the CEO to maintain an objective view and even personal 




Bank, who not so long ago had to step down for some time allegedly due to overwork and 
pressure. The effective chairperson is aware of the CEO well-being and emotional stability and 
intervenes when it is required.  
 
‘I saw the CEO regularly one-to-one obviously between board meetings. He liked to come 
and get stuff off his chest which was important’. (Chairperson 7) 
 
One chairperson described this role as taking the CEO to the “psychologist couch”: 
 
‘And I, as chairman, particularly with the chief executive … he was actually on the 
psychologist’s couch, if you can imagine this: you could’ve seen me here with my notes, 
him lying on the couch. I had just a massive outpouring of everything from his entire time 
in this business that he thought was wrong with it, that he thought was wrong with the 
leadership, that he thought was wrong with this individual and everything else. So I had 
to do a lot of listening. All part of the trust process: if he’s going to tell you his innermost 
secrets, you sit there and listen’. (Chairperson 13) 
 
Leader of the board. A final role for the chairperson which emerged strongly from this study 
is the more classical role as “leader of the board”. Chairpersons and CEOs agree that this is the 
Chairperson domain par excellence. Chairpersons have great discretion as to board 
composition, NED engagement, CEO-Board engagement, committee composition and 
functioning, board agenda building and the conduction of meetings. While all these aspects are 
important, it is then important that the board meetings are effective places of challenge and 
debate. It is in his role as chair of the board meetings that the chairperson plays his/her further 
regulating role: the chairperson regulates the group processes in the board. These processes 
includes the presence and use of knowledge and skills, effort norms, and cognitive conflict 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). In effect, chairpersons regulate interpersonal exchanges during 
meetings, the amounts of tension and cognitive conflict that the board can take without 
compromising cohesion, the use of knowledge and skills and the degree of consensus and 
shared-understanding. Through an inclusive style the chairperson makes the maximum use of 




conversation, pauses it, summarises and concludes at different points, critically regulating 
board dynamics.  
 
‘… when you get to chairman level, you need to do a lot more of: right – this is the 
issue; what do people think? And let the debate go, maybe direct the debate a little 
bit, pull people in, but try and let the debate happen. And then conclude and 
summarise and let the decision be a board decision rather than a chairman decision’. 
(Chairperson 5) 
 
The chairperson ensures that controversial topics are on the board agenda and promotes 
vigorous discussion whilst maintaining board cohesion and unity of action. The chair regulates 
the amount of cognitive conflict and tension, whilst safeguarding the integrity of the board. This 
regulation function of the chair has been depicted in the literature has been at the crux of 
effective chairmanship (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007a; Taylor, 2001).  
 
‘… these are the situations where there’s lots of issues and lots of judgements to be 
made. And a good board should be one that can debate those issues openly and can 
manage argument successfully. The job of the chairman is making sure that issues 
come on the table and people do collide. Now it, you would love to think the board 
will be as one, there will be no conflict, but actually there are issues – discuss them, 
otherwise you will make a wrong judgement. But the executive team need that 
supportive guidance, and that doesn’t just mean saying yes’. (Chairperson 1) 
 
The idea that chairs must “dose” the levels of cognitive conflict and disagreement in the 
boardroom was in fact very prevalent in this study. Consider the following chairperson 
perspective: 
‘It doesn’t mean that you should never have disagreement in the boardroom, no, but 
you should be careful: you should dose it because if you, either it becomes a vote 
of non-confidence vis-à-vis an individual. The challenge for a chairman has to make 
sure that touchy items become a topic and not an item from the CEO. On the next 
board meeting we have two what I call topics, and everybody can there say draw a 
line or raise a flag because it’s a topic. It’s different versus if the CEO would say, 
“This is what I want to do”, because then you have to say no to the CEO or yes to 
the CEO. But here it’s brought as to “this is a topic” and everybody just, you have 
a guided discussion … During the board meetings you make sure as a chairman that 
everybody has his point of view because you have different characters. You have 
some people that are very talkative. There are some people they are just saying 
nothing, but once they say something it is dot on. But try to make sure that at the 
end of an important discussion that you go round the table and ask each member 





The chairperson role as leader of the board emerged in this study as serving a regulating 
function. The chair emerged has the individual who regulates board processes, harnessing the 
variety of knowledge and experience to confront difficult challenges that arise in contexts of 
resource-scarcity, uncertainty and complexity.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
This study is the first to the author’s knowledge to systematically present evidence for the 
exercise of a buffering role by chairpersons in separate board leadership structures in contexts 
marked by resource scarcity, low munificence and poor firm performance.  The evidence 
presented and the corresponding novel conceptualisation of the role of the chairperson opens 
promising avenues for future research. It adds to the resource-dependence literature by showing 
that chairpersons can organise the provision of resources within a broader conceptualisation of 
the role as a buffer. In such conceptualization, the chairman may provide resources that either 
insulate (for example through the provision of legitimacy, or handling shareholder pressures) 
or regulate (through additional advise and counsel) the CEO. This allows conceiving the 
chairman as maintaining the homeostatic balance between the CEO, the board, the shareholders 
and the wider environment in a manner that is conducive to firm adaptation and performance. 
The study also answers calls for a better understanding of what chairpersons actually do, 
specifically in environments marked by resource scarcity, low-munificence and poor 
performance (Krause, 2017; Withers and Fitza, 2017). It adds to previous conceptualizations of 
the portfolio of roles that the chairperson plays in relation to the CEO (Stewart, 1991), by 
providing a new empirical conceptualization of the chairperson as a buffer, encompassing a 
variety of other roles.  
 





Future research needs to further test which components of the buffering role are more 
important using survey techniques on a large sample of chairperson and CEOs. Questions about 
the relative balance between insulation and regulation and how this relative balance impacts 
board effectiveness and firm performance are of particular importance. The relative emphasis 
of chairperson on insulating or regulating roles may depend on firm, CEO, chairperson and 
contextual characteristics. For example, do new CEOs require more insulation or more 
regulation? When the chairperson is personally involved in the selection of the CEO does it 
tend to over-insulate him/her from pressures? Under which circumstances does too much 
regulation become dysfunctional? These and other questions require new studies that use factor 
analysis and regression techniques to further investigate the chairperson buffering role and 
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Role Age Gender Ethnicity Qualification 
Chairperson 1 60 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 2 70 M WB Law  
Chairperson 3 66 M WB NA 
Chairperson 4 63 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 5 56 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 6 62 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 7 54 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 8 64 M OWB MBA 
Chairperson 9 68 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 10 64 M WB Geography & Economics 
Chairperson 11 62 M WB Engineering 
Chairperson 12 61 M WB MBA 
Chairperson 13 61 M WB Accounting 
Chairperson 14 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO1 56 M WB Accounting 
CEO2 53 M WB MBA 
CEO3 49 M WB Accounting 
CEO4 52 M OWB Accounting 
CEO5 62 M WB MBA 
CEO6 52 M WB MBA 
CEO7 50 M WB Economics 
CEO8 56 M OWB International Relations 
CEO9 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO10 58 M WB Accounting 
CEO11 64 M WB Economics 
CEO12 66 M WB NA 
CEO13 53 F WB Management Studies 
CEO14 54 M WB Accounting 
CEO15 57 M WB Geology 
CEO16 61 M WB MBA 
Note 1: WB – White British; OWB – Other White Background; AMP – Advanced Management 
















 Communicates with external 
stakeholders setting expectations 
of performance  
 Stops undue expectations to enter 
CEO /TMT concerns  
 
 Acts as a conduit of information 
between shareholders and the 
board and; 
 Between the CEO/ management 
team  
Alleviates the CEO from particular 
demands allowing him/her to 
concentrate on the core of the job:  
 Dealing with particular 
stakeholders  
 Taking executive responsibility  
 Acts as a senior advisor to the 
CEO, allowing the calibration of 
ideas, plans and strategies  
 Advises on ‘political’ issues  
Acts as a counsellor of the CEO 
allowing the regulation of CEO 
emotions and responses to particular 
pressures: 
 Personal values  
 Difficult board members 
 




Partner Role  
 
Advisory Role  
 
Counselling Role  
 
Leads the board meetings, 
regulating group exchanges / 
dynamics: 
 Sets the rules of engagement 
 Sets the board agenda  
 Regulates group processes during 
board meetings.  
Leader of the Board  
 
Axial Codes Thematic Codes  
Insulating 
Buffering Role  
Core Theme(s)   
Regulating 
